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COMMENT
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
PHYSCHIATRIST AND PATIENT*
MANFRED

S.

GUTTMACIER"

and
HENRY WEIHOFENt$

A doctor on the witness stand is in most jurisdictions not allowed,
'without his patient's consent, to disclose any information acquired in
attending the patient in a professional capacity.' The leading authorities on the law of evidence rather unanimously take the view that
this privilege serves no useful legal purpose, that on the contrary it
does real harm in numerous cases by preventing the discovery of the
truth, and that it should be abolished. 2 The Model Code of Evidence,
prepared by a distinguished committee under the aegis of the American
Law Institute, in its original draft made no provision for any such
privilege, but lawyers from the states which recognize the privilege
forced its inclusion, although with provisions limiting its application
very drastically.
Whether the objections levelled against the privilege in the types
of cases where abuse is most frequent-for example, personal injury
cases-hold valid in psychiatric cases has never been adequately con*The substance of this comment will appear in a forthcoming book on psy-

chiatry and the law, to be published in the fall of 1952 by W. W. Norton & Company,
Inc.
t M.D., 1923, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine; Chairman of the
American Psychiatric Association Committee on the Legal Aspects of Psychiatry;
psychiatric adviser to United Nations Committee on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Criminals; Jacob Gimbel lecturer on sex psychology, Stanford University
(1950) ; chief medical officer, Supreme Bench of Baltimore.
t J.D., 1928, J.S.D., 1930, University of Chicago; author of Insanity as a Defense
in Criminal Law, and articles dealing with mental disorder and law; Professor of Law,
University of New Mexico.
1. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3rd ed. 1940); Note, 52 CoL. L. REV. 383
(1952). Seventeen states retain the common lav rule, under which no privilege is
recognized covering communications between physician and patient. Chafee, Privileged
Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth
on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 18 ANN. INT. MED. 606 (1943).
2.

8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2380-91; Chafee supra note 1; Curd, Privileged

Commnidcations between the Doctor and his Patient-AnI anonmaly of the Law, 44
W. Va. L.Q. 165 (1938); Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructionm to Expert
Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CmI. L. REv. 285 (1943).
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sidered. A few months ago, however, the issue was squarely raised
by a Chicago psychiatrist, Dr. Roy R. Grinker, director of the Institute
for Psychosomatic and Psychiatric Research and Training, at Michael
Reese Hospital. He .was summoned to testify in a suit for alienation
of affections brought by a husband against another man. Dr. Grinker
had treated the wife, and he refused to divulge in court confidential
information, which might have been prejudicial to her, communicated
to him by her while she was in the hospital.
Dr. Grinker was ready to be cited for contempt of court, if
necessary, and take the issue to the appellate courts. The trial judge
ruled, however, that a psychiatrist was not required to testify to
matters told to him in confidence, even though there is no Illinois statute
3
conferring such a privilege.
We submit that the judge's basic premise is correct. The peculiarly
close relationship of trust and confidence required between physician
and patient in psychotherapy makes the situation a special one, not
necessarily governed by the same considerations as the ordinary doctorpatient relationship.
It is not our purpose to quarrel with the basic viewpoint of the
evidence authorities that the privilege, as applied to doctor-patient
relations generally, -is unsound. But most of the objections that have
been raised against it are hardly applicable to psychiatric cases. Thus,
it has been said that few patients have litigation in mind when they
consult a doctor, or have any reason for wanting to keep the facts
of their illness or injury secret. Of those who do have litigation in
mind, the majority, such as the personal injury plaintiffs, are usually
anxious to round up as many witnesses as possible to testify in open
court as to what happened. If such a patient objects to the testimony
of the doctor who examined or treated him, it is not because he wants
3. "The psychiatrist's sphere of interest," said Judge Harry M. Fisher, "necessarily covers every experience of the patient. He may be interested in knowing the
experiences of childhood. That may weigh very heavily with him in determining the
cause of the disturbance. He may be interested in the experience of the patient during
puberty, during adolescence. In fact, what he seeks to do is to bring back to the
conscious memory of the patient things forgotten but which lie dormant in the subconscious mind. He probes deeply, and it is necessary for him to get that information
out of the mouth of his patient . . . It doesn't require any scientific knowledge to
understand that there can be no success in the effort to ascertain the true cause of the
disturbance or in determining the kind of treatment that should be applied unless
there is a complete confidence in the mind of the patient, not alone in the capacity
and skill of the psychiatrist, but in the secrecy of the things transpiring in the doctor's
chambers. That relationship in that respect is unique and is not at all similar to the
relationship between physician and patient." This quotation was taken from Judge
Fisher's opinion which was sent to Professor Weihofen by Dr. Grinker. Also see
Chicago Sun-Times, June 25, 1952, § 1, p. 3, col. 3.
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to keep his injuries secret, but almost certainly because he is afraid
the doctor will testify that he was not injured at all! Mental ill
health, however, is still a matter of which patients are likely to be
more ashamed than physical ill health or injury, and there is a good
deal-more reason for supposing that a person who consults a phychiatrist intends to speak in more strict confidence than the automobile accident
plaintiff. Of the types of cases in which the privilege is most often
invoked, the chief one where psychiatric questions ordinarily arise is
the will contest in which the testator's mental competency is disputed.
Less frequently, psychiatric questions arise also in divorce cases where
the patient may have confessed infidelities to his psychiatrist, and in
cases of individuals seeking treatment for perverse sexual behavior.
Unlike the personal injury plaintiff, the testator in a will contest is
not voluntarily in court alleging that he was injured or ill. Of infidelities and sexual perversion, it is obvious that the patient is likely
to have the possibility of litigation in mind, and probably would not
be willing to speak frankly to his psychiatrist if he knew the 'latter
could be compelled to testify.
The psychiatrist must insist on very personal data, and must
explore the relationship of the patient's acts to his basic drives, which
can only be adequately revealed by his deepest and most secret thoughts
and feelings. This is true not only in psychoanalysis but in all psychotherapy. The possibly neurotic nature of even such patently criminal
acts as forgery or theft cannot be determined without exploring the
patient's attitudes and behavior in regard to masturbation, homosexuality, etc.
What is more, the patient's statements may reveal to his therapist
much more than the patient intends or realizes. The psychiatric patient
confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to
the therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays bare
his entire self, his dreams, phantasies, sins and shame. Most patients who
undergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be expected of them,
and that they cannot get help except on that condition. It is extremely
hard for them to bring themselves to the point where they are willing
to expose the dark recesses of their mind to the psychiatrist; often
patients have undergone therapy for a year or more before they begin
to reveal anything significant. It would be too much to expect them
to do so if they knew that all they say, and all that the psychiatrist
learns from what they say, may be revealed to the whole world from a
witness stand.
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The patient may begin treatment with a distrust of all persons
who have played a prominent role in his life, and so without any basis
for trust in the analyst or in anyone else. He cannot suddenly perform
an act or assume an attitude that is beyond his experience. Only slowly
and painfully can he be brought into a healthy relationship of security
and trust with the psychiatrist, and achieve a feeling of being accepted
for what he is without the attachment of moral judgments. This
struggle goes on in large parts at an unconscious level. Unless the
patient feels relaxed and safe with his therapist, powerful control is
unconsciously exercised by the psychological mechanism of repression.
When such a feeling of security is lacking, the patient unwittingly
blocks or stultifies himself.
Perhaps all of the privileged relationships that the law protects
are those in which the communicant becomes in a sense an extension
of the personality of the communicator. Husband and wife, we say,
are one; when the husband discusses a subject with his wife, he is
talking to his other, or as we say, his better half. The client talking
to his lawyer is talking to his own representative, his champion, his
advocate, his "mouthpiece," to use a vulgar term which very aptly
expresses this concept of the extension of the self. The priest, the
"father," is the intermediary through whom one talks to God, to
relieve oneself of the weight of sin-consciousness. The patient revealing his anxieties and his guilt feelings to the psychiatrist is also trying
to work his way through to peace and understanding. The psychiatrist has become for him the loving and forgiving parent.
Of course, these considerations, emphasizing the usefulness and
even the necessity of preserving the confidentiality of the psychiatristpatient relationship, must be balanced against the importance of getting
at the truth in litigated cases before we can reach a considered judgment as to whether the privilege should be allowed. Suppose in the
trial of Alger Hiss that it had transpired that Whittaker Chambers, the
one all-important witness against Hiss, had been under treatment by a
psychiatrist (this is a wholly supposititious illustration, let it be understood, not intended to be taken as true in fact). If the privilege were
abrogated, Hiss could, in the case assumed, have summoned the psychiatrist and compelled him to testify. This might have been of the
utmost value, as, for example, if the psychiatrist had been forced to
state that from his examination and treatment he was convinced that
Chambers was a pathological liar. The suppression of such evidence
by operation of the_ privilege may work the most outrageous in-
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justice, in that it may result in the conviction of an innocent man on
the testimony of a witness who, but for the privilege, could have been
shown to be unworthy of belief. On the other hand, what would have
been the effect on the willingness of neurotic or psychotic individuals
to consult a psychiatrist if they read in the front-page newspaper'
accounts of such a sensational case that a psychiatrist could be summoned by one's opponent to reveal in the courtroom what one had
confessed in strictest confidence in the consulting room? The question
is not without difficulty, but we submit that the possible injustice that
might be done by the suppression of evidence in individual cases is outweighed by the importance of assuring patients that the confidentiality
of their relations with their psychiatrist is absolute, and not subject
to violation even on a court summons.
The balance of interests may not be the same in criminal as in
civil cases. It may be argued that even if the privilege is allowed in
civil litigation, no doctor-psychiatrist or other-should be allowed
to refuse to reveal to the agencies of the state information relevant
to the detection and prosecution of crime. In several states the
privilege is restricted to civil cases. 4 In others, it is expressly made
inapplicable to certain situations where it might defeat strong public
policy, as in abortion, venereal or narcotic cases.5 But we believe that
the rationale of these policy exceptions does not extend to denying in
all criminal cases the privileged status of communications made in the
course of psychotherapy. The amount of good society might derive
from obtaining a certain number of additional convictions by the help
of the psychiatrist's testimony would almost certainly be outweighed
by the harm done in destroying the confidentiality of the psychiatristpatient relationship. Punishment is not that much more important than
therapy.
Except for the Illinois trial court decision already referred to,
and a 1948 Kentucky statute, 6 we know of no legal support for our
suggestion that there is greater reason for the privilege in phychiatric
than in other medical cases. On the contrary, in some states cases of
mental and emotional disorders are perhaps excluded from the statutes
creating the privilege for doctor-patient communications generally.
This peculiar situation results where the privilege is extended only to
4. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1881(4) (Deering 1946); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(4)
(Cum. Supp. 1951); OmE. Co-mp. LAWS ANN. §3-104(a) (1940); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28, § 328 (1939) ; S.D. CODE § 36.0101(3) (1939) ; UTAH CoDE ANN. § 104-49-3(4)

(1943).
5. WIGmORE,
6. Ky. REV.

EVIDENCE §§ 220, 2380.
STAT. § 319,110 (1948).

-
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"licensed" or "authorized" physicians, .and where the licensing acts
do not apply to the treatment of mental and emotional disorders.7 In
these states, a psychiatrist practicing without a medical license, as he
legally may do, would clearly not be within the privilege. And the
same may be true notwithstanding that he does have a license to practice medicine, on the theory that when he administers psychiatric therapy
he is not engaging in the "practice of medicine" as defined by the
statute and is therefore not within the privilege so far as such cases
are concerned. There seem to be no cases on the point.
Most of the statutes extend the privilege to all physicians and
surgeons without reference to whether they are licensed or not.8 Such
statutes would seem to include phychiatrists, for psychiatrists are physicians, i.e., they are doctors of medicine specializing in psychiatry. A
psychologist, on the other hand, is not a doctor of medicine; he is not
a graduate of a medical school. If he holds a doctorate, it is from a
liberal arts college, that is, he may be a Ph.D., but he is not an M.D.
He is therefore not within the privilege; nor is a lay analyst-a psychoanalyst who is not licensed to practice medicine. Nor are nurses or
hospital attendants privileged, except when acting as assistants or agents
of physicians.0 Faith healers, osteopaths and chiropractors are not within
the privilege' 0 except where they are within the state definition of
physicians and surgeons.
7. ARx. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 617 (1947); ME. REv. STAT. C. 61, § 8 (1944);
MASS. ANN. LAWS C.112, § 7 (1949) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.10 (Cum. Supp. 1951) ;
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 45.9-18.1 (1937) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90.18 (1950) ; OHIO CODE
ANN. § 1286 (Supp. 1950); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 492 (1941); S.D. CODE C. 106, § 14
(1949); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6937 (Michie Supp. 1950); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 10024 (1932) ; Wis. STAT. § 147.19(2) (1949). In Arkansas, South Dakota, Tennessee,
and perhaps other of these states, so-called basic science laws require the passing of an
examination in the "basic sciences" before one can practice any of the healing professions. See Note, Regulation of Psychological Counseling and Psychotherapy, 51
COL. L. REv. 474 (1951).
8. "Fifteen of the statutes extend the privilege generally to physicians and surgeons
or to physicians alone, two limit it to 'regular' physicians and surgeons, and nine apply
it only to licensed or authorized physicians and surgeons. The five remaining statutes
use language which, in addition to covering physicians and surgeons, embraces other
persons connected with medical treatment." Note, 52 COL. L. REv. 383, 391 (1952).
9. First Trust Co. v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 48 (1935) (nurse-dietitian) ; Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez, 4 F.2d 215 (1925) (nurse assisting doctor);
Laurie Co. v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 90 N.E. 1014 (1909) (gymnasium teacher of
exercises prescribed by physician); Miss. P. & L. Co. v. Jordan, 164 Miss. 174, 143
So. 483 (1932) (nurse assisting physician); Culver v. Union Pacific R.R., 112 Neb.
441, 199 N.W. 794 (1924); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Kozlowski, 226 Wis. 641, 276 N.W.
300 (1937) (nurse and X-ray operator). See Notes, 169 A.L.R. 678 (1947) ; 22 MARQ.
L. REv. 211 (1938) ; 68 A.L.R. 176 (1930) ; 39 A.L.R. 1421 (1925).
10. In re Mossman's Estate, 119 Cal. App. 404, 6 P.2d 576 (1931) (Christian
Science practitioner) ; Kress & Co. v. Sharp, 156 Miss. 693, 126 So. 650 (1930) (chiropractor).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Wholly apart from any legal privilege, it would be unethical for
a psychiatrist to imply that an interview was confidential and then
to disclose it to the agencies of the state. A confession obtained by
improper influences exerted by a psychiatrist working for the prosecution has been held inadmissible in evidence by the New York Court
of Appeals."
Both the American Psychoanalytic Association and the American
Psychiatric Association were aroused some time ago by an editorial
written by J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for the Journal of the American Medical Association, in which
he urged physicians to report any of their patients whom they suspect
of subscribing to subversive ideology. 1 2 It was felt that knowledge
by patients that psychiatrists engage in such a practice would do far
more harm by its adverse effect on treatment than any good it could
possibly do the government, and that such an "invitation," if accepted,
might soon lead to more insistent attempts to force physicians to
disclose confidences of their patients.
In England, it seems to be considered unethical for the examiner
even to discuss the circumstances surrounding the crime with the suspect,
let alone to reveal his statements to the authorities. This seems to go
very far, for it is difficult to see how a psychiatrist can examine a subject for the purpose of determining his capacity to understand the
nature and quality of his act without touching on the circumstances
surrounding its commission. But a psychiatrist making an examination for the prosecution certainly should explain to the defendant or
suspect that notes are being taken and that a report will be sent to
the court or other official agency, and should advise him that he may
decline to answer questions which he does not want included in the
report. Such a concession will not usually lead the subject to withhold information. He will, typically, be willing and even anxious to
tell his side of the story to the psychiatrist.
11. "Bearing in mind," said the court, "the undisputed setting in which this interview was arranged and recorded, while defendant was in custody of the police; defendant's physical and mental condition at the time . . .; the psychiatrist, calling himself defendant's doctor, playing upon the latter's natural fears and hopes, pressing
his hands upon defendant's head with accompanying commands, and suggesting details
to an unwilling mind by persistence and unceasing questioning; informing defendant
that he was not morally responsible; making deceptive assurances of friendship and numerous promises, express and implied; giving assurances in a pseudo-confidential atmosphere of physician and patient; and all the attendant circumstances taken together-this
interview was a subtle intrusion upon the rights of defendant and was tantamount to a
form of coercion, which, despite the good faith of the prosecution, we may not countenance here." People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 96 N.E.2d 553 (1951).
12. Hoover, Let's Keep America Healthy, 144 A.M.A.J. 1094, 1095 (1950).
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The medical profession should properly insist upon a high standard
of ethics in preserving the confidences of clients. Even without the
statutory privilege, there is no legal obligation on a doctor or anyone
else to volunteer information to the police, or to the FBI, or even
to answer questions by police agencies. It is only where the physician
is summoned by judicial process to appear in court and give testimony
in a legal proceeding that he can be compelled to speak, in absence of
the privilege. Against disclosures outside the court room the legislatures have provided no protection. So far as statutes go, the doctor
may with legal impunity chat about the case at a cocktail party or
describe it in detail in a medical journal. Legal protection here is
afforded only in so far as the courts might find an invasion of the
right of privacy, and recovery on this ground will be allowed only if
13
the publication went beyond the limits of reasonableness and decency.
In the main, the patient's confidences are protected against disclosure
outside the court room primarily by the code of professional ethics
rather than by the law.
The privilege does not apply where the doctor merely observes a
defendant while in confinement, or examines him at the instance of
the other party or the court for purpose of testifying at his trial, for
that does not constitute attending a patient in a professional capacity.1 4
But it has been held that it does apply where the doctor administers
treatment, even though the person was not a voluntary patient, as where
he was brought to a clinic by the police for examination, or where he
was unconsicous at the time.1 5 By the same token, the privilege has
been held to exist between an inmate of a mental institution and staff
13. See Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920); Challender,
Doctor-PatientRelationship and the Right of Privacy, 11 U. PiT'rs. L. REv. 624 (1950).
14. San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951) ; State v.
Fouquette, 221 P.2d 214 (Nev. 1950); People v. Barnes, 197 Misc. 447, 98 N.Y.S. 481
(1950) ; Hanlon v. Woodhouse, 113 Colo. 504, 160 P.2d 998 (1945); People v. Dutton,

62 Cal. App.2d 862, 145 P.2d 678 (1944) ; State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E.
187 (1928) ; State v. Murphy, 205 Ia. 1130, 217 N.W. 225 (1928); People v. Furlong,
187 N.Y. 198, 79 N.E. 978 (1907) ; 1 WEST. REs. L. REv. 142 (1949); 107 A.L.R. 1491,

1495 (1937).
15. Clapp v. State, 73 Okla- Cr. 261, 120 P.2d 381 (1941); Palmer v. Order of
United Comm. Travelers, 187 Minn. 272, 245 N.W. 146 (1932); Battis v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 124 Ia. 623, 100 N.W. 543 (1904). In the first case, Clapp killed a person
driving his car and was charged with manslaughter. The testimony of the physician
and the nurse at the hospital to which he was brought after the accident was that when
they examined him they detected liquor on his breath, was held inadmissible. See
other cases collected in Note, 79 A.LR. 1131 (1932). In Meyer v. Knights of Pythias,

178 N.Y. 63, 70 N.E. 111 (1904), a hotel called a doctor to attend a guest The latter
said he had taken poison and objected strenuously to the doctor's doing anything for
him. The doctor did succeed in administering a hypodermic. In a suit for the life

insurance benefit, the doctor was not allowed to testify about the poison, a highly
relevant matter because the policy provided for forfeiture in case of suicide.
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doctors. 16 So far has the privilege been extended beyond the original
premise of protecting confidential communications that courts assume
without argument that all statements of inmates to hospital doctors
come within the rule.
Even where the doctor-patient relation clearly exists, it is only
information coming to the doctor in the course of that professional
relation which is privileged If he has known the patient socially, there
can be no objection on the ground of privilege to his testifying to what
he learned through such contacts. 1 7 Thus, he can testify to hearing
the patient make threats against his wife, since that was not part of
the professional relationship.' 8
But this line between statements made in the course of professional treatment and other statements is not always an easy one to
trace. This is particularly true in psychiatric cases. In the case mentioned above, while the patient's threats against his wife may be clearly
outside the professional relationship if the doctor who heard them
were treating him for bronchitis, they would probably be of the highest
professional relevance if the doctor were administering psychiatric
treatment. Indeed, psychoanalytic theories regarding the unconscious
make practically everything the patient says relevant, even though the
relevance may not be logically apparent. The analyst himself is really
the only one competent to say whether a given statement made to him
by the patient in the course of examination or treatment comes within
the rule.' 9
The privilege belongs to the patient, not the doctor. If the patient
consents to the testimony, the doctor has no basis for refusing to
answer. 20 For the same reason, the patient cannot be forced to testify
to such privileged communications any more than the doctor can.
16. Linscott v. Hughbanks, 140 Kan. 353, 37 P.2d 26 (1934).
17. Watkins v. Watkins, 142 Miss. 210, 106 So. 753 (1926).
18. Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 542, 137 N.E. 547 (1922). A doctor can testify that
a patient being treated following an accident was intoxicated, for that was not information communicated to him by the patient to enable the doctor to treat him. State v.
Townsend, 146 Kan. 982, 73 P.2d 1124 (1937). But some cases hold everything divulged
in the course of the physician-patient relationship to be privileged. McRae v. Erickson,
1 Cal. App. 326, 82 Pac. 209 (1905); Brayman v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 124
Ia. 623, 100 N.W. 543 (1904) ; Munz v. R. Co., 25 Utah 220, 70 Pac. 852 (1902) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion, 123 Ind. 415, 23 N.E. 973 (1889); 7 L.R.A. 687 (1890); 18
Am. St. Rep. 330 (1890).
19. Even in non-psychiatric cases, at least a minority of states hold that the
physician and not the trial judge determines whether the information acquired was
necessary for treatment. Johns v. Clark, 138 Wash. 288, 244 Pac. 729 (1926) ; Note,
13 WASH. L. REv. 141 (1938).
20. Doty v. Crystal Ice & F. Co., 118 Kan. 363, 235 Pac. 96 (1925) ; Angerstein v.
Milwaukee Monument Co., 169 Wis. 502, 173 N.W. 215 (1919).
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In a Kansas case,-" a doctor was sued for alleged negligence in
performing a hysterectomy. Plaintiff introduced evidence that after the
operation, the patient, plaintiff's wife, was not able to control her bladder.
Shortly after the series of operations, the woman had been committed
to the state hospital as insane. The doctor-defendant offered as a witness
a staff doctor of the hospital to prove that the latter had examined
her after her admission and concluded that her incontinence was not
caused by the operations but by lack of conscious control of the sphincter
muscle due to her mental condition, and that it ceased within a week
after her admission. This was objected to as privileged. The defendant
argued: (1) that the doctor-patient relation did not exist here, since
the woman had never voluntarily entered into such a relation with the
staff physician of the hospital to which she had been committed, and
the treatment accorded her at such hospital is a matter open to public
inquiry; and (2) that if the privilege existed, it had been waived by
plaintiff's having testified fully about the operations and her mental
condition. The court held that the privilege extends to relations between
a patient committed to a mental institution and a staff doctor, and that
it had not been waived, because the plaintiff had not testified to the very
transactions which defendant wanted the hospital doctor to testify to.
Plaintiff had testified to the fact that his wife had been confined in the
state hospital, but not to the examinations there made. This seems an
unjusifiably narrow view of the waiver rule.
Suppose a patient has died since the consultation; can anyone now
give valid consent to the doctor's testifying? Most statutes provide that
his administrator or executor may give the consent, but a few fail to
cover this contingency. In such states, the privilege designed to protect
the patient may defeat his desires, for cases have arisen where it is
fairly clear that if alive, he would have wanted the doctor to speak. In
a will case, 22 where it was alleged that the testator suffered from general
paresis (which, as it is well known, is caused by syphilis), a physician
who had examined him was not permitted to testify on the basis of his
examination of the deceased that he was of sound mind, even though the
physician was offered as a witness by the sole heir at law of the deceased
and his administratrix and personal representative. The privilege, the
21. Linscott v. Hughbanks, 140 Kan. 353, 37 P.2d 26 (1934).
22. Watkins v. Watkins, 142 Miss. 210, 106 So. 753 (1926). For other Mississippi
cases illustrating the objections to the rule, see Lipscomb, Privileged Communications
Statute-Sword and Shield, 16 Miss. L.J. 181 (1944). Mississippi has since amended
its statute to permit the privilege to be waived by the personal representative or legal
heirs of the patient, where he has since died. Miss. STAT. 1944, c. 315, p. 540. For
cases from other states see 8 WIG1IORE, EVIDENCE § 2391; Note, 126 A.L.R. 167 (1924).
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court said, could be waived only by the patient himself. Although it said
that the "manifest reason and obvious purpose of the statute was to
enable a patient to disclose his infirmities to his physician in order that
the physician may prescribe for his disease without fear that his feelings
will be shocked or his reputation tarnished by their disclosure by the
physician without his consent," the court here applied that "manifest
reason and obvious purpose" to prevent a doctor from refuting the
attempt to tarnish the dead man's reputation.
However, what the court excluded by one legal technicality, it managed to let wriggle in by another. This same doctor, after stating that
he could segregate in his mind the knowledge he had acquired about the
condition of the testator from having been his physician from what he
had acquired from social contact with him, was permitted to testify
that in his opinion the testator was of sound mind. Of course, this
required carefully putting to one side any scientific basis for his opinion,
and resting it wholly on casual social contacts. It also required the trial
judge to determine whether the doctor was able thus to segregate his
knowledge coming from the one source from that coming from the other.
Psychologists are, of course, unanimous in their view that such an
actual division is impossible. 23 Another doctor who had also treated
the testator was permitted to testify, not to what he actually had learned
on professional examination, but to his abstract opinion in answer to
hypothetical questions. It is easy to ridicule this result, and yet it is perfectly sound under the legal premises on which the exclusionary rule is
based.
It has been held that the patient does not waive the privilege by
introducing another physician to testify about the same facts.2 4 The
sounder rule is that calling one physician to testify to one's condition is
a waiver of the privilege as to the testimony of other physicians regarding such condition. 25 Indeed, the mere fact of bringing suit raising a
23. At least one court has also pointed out this impossibility: "The human mind
is not competent to separate the facts of which it is cognizant into classes-those which
were obtained professionally and those facts coming within the observation of the
witness not so obtained-and distinguish an opinion derived from one series of facts
from an opinion derived from another." Larson v. State, 92 Neb. 24, 137 N.W. 894
(1912).
24. Johnson v. Kinney, 232 Ia. 1016, 7 N.W.2d 188 (1942); Russell v. Penn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 113, 41 N.E.2d 251 (1941); and cases cited in 8
WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 2390. See Notes, 51 HAmv. L, REv. 931 (1938); 31 YALE L.J.
529 (1922) ; 62 A.L.R. 680 (1929).
25. State v. Cochran, 356 Mo. 788, 203 S.W.2d 713 (1947); Denny v. Robertson,
352 Mo. 609, 179 S.W.2d 5 (1944); Leifson v. Henning, 210 Minn. 307, 298 N.W. 41
(1941) ; Albritton v. Ferguson, 197 Ark. 436, 122 S.W.2d 620 (1938) ; Keeton v. State,
175 Miss. 631, 167 So. 68 (1936); Re Quick's Estate, 161 Wash. 537, 297 Pac. 178

(1931).

COMMENT
medical issue should be deemed a waiver of the privilege for all communications to any physicians concerning such issue. No court has been
willing to go so far, but in California the legislature has provided that
bringing suit for personal injuries or for wrongful death waives the
privilege as to any physician who has "prescribed for or treated" the
plaintiff or who "attended" the deceased. 26 Where a person not merely
brings suit but voluntarily testifies to his medical condition, a number of
courts hold the privilege waived.2 7 It would seem proper to apply this
to psychiatric as well as to other medical cases. Notwithstanding what
we have said regarding the need for inviolability of psychiatric confidences, when a plaintiff, who is himself fully competent, voluntarily
makes his mental condition an issue in a judicial proceeding, and especially if he himself testifies as to his condition, he can properly be said
to have waived confidentiality. Even here, however, immaterial confidences and irrelevant details of confidences would of course be excluded
and courts should be vigilant not to require unnecessary exposures.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in those states
that have adopted similar rules, the operation of the privilege may be
effectively cut down by Rule 35, which authorizes the trial court to order
examination by a physician of a party whose mental or physical condition
is in controversy. If the party so examined requests and obtains a copy
of the physician's report (which he will ordinarily want, for purposes
of cross-examination), he thereby waives any privilege regarding the
testimony of any other person who has examined him. Although this
might be said in practical effect to empower the trial judge to deprive a
party of the privilege, we believe that even this rule is still sufficiently
restricted so that it does not too seriously invade the confidentiality of
communication. First, it is limited to parties, and does not extend to
mere witnesses. Second, it becomes operative only where the judge
orders an examination. The order is not to be made except "for good
cause shown," and the judge would presumably not so order unless the
question of the party's condition appears to be a substantial one. Third,
the party to be examined is allowed a voice in choosing the courtappointed physician. If he strenuously objects to the physician proposed
by the other side, the court will ordinarily appoint someone else,
preferably someone on whom the parties can agree. And finally, the
26. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1881 (4) (Deering 1946).
27. 8 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2389. See also cases collected in 114 A.L.R. 798 (1938):
62 A.L.R. 680 (1929); Notes 51 H~Av. L. REv. 931 (1938); 31 YALE, LJ. 529 (1922).
Two recent cases illustrate the split in court viewpoints: Hudman v. State, 89 Okla.
Cr. 160, 205 P.2d 1175 (1949), holding that taking the stand oneself and offering one
physician as a witness waives the privilege as to other physicians; Harrington v. Hadden, 69 Idaho 22, 202 P.2d 236 (1949), contra.
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party may still keep the privilege regarding communications to other
physicians if he wants to do so, by foregoing asking to see a copy of
the, report. This is a high cost only to the party who has reason to fear
that the report will disagree with his own evidence.
In summary, we believe that the question of whether a physicianpatient privilege is sound and should be legally recognized ought not
to be debated in general terms, but should be resolved into specific types
of physician-patient relationships, taking into account for each type both
the therapeutic importance of confidentiality and, on the other hand, the
evidence of abuse in practice. Specifically, we believe that psychiatric
therapy requires a peculiarly close relationship of trust and confidence
between therapist and patient, and that it is not one of the fields where
abuse is notably prevalent. As in most fields, we are not limited to black
and white answers. Careful study of the problem should enable us to
devise a rule recognizing the privilege subject to limitations adequate
to prevent abuse.
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